CHAPTER III.
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NAME TÂO? AND THE CHIEF POINTS OF
BELIEF IN TÂOISM.
Meaning of the name Tâo.
1. The first translation of the Tâo Teh King into a Western language
was executed in Latin by some of the Roman Catholic missionaries,
and a copy of it was brought to England by a Mr. Matthew Raper,
F. R. S., and presented by him to the Society at a meeting on
the 10th January, 1788,—being the gift to him of P. Jos.
de Grammont, 'Missionarius Apostolicus, ex-Jesuita.' In this version
Tâo is taken in the sense of Ratio, or the Supreme Reason of the
Divine Being, the Creator and Governor.
M. Abel Rémusat, the first Professor of Chinese in Paris, does
not seem to have been aware of the existence of the above version
in London, but his attention was attracted to Lâo's treatise about
1820, and, in 1823, he wrote of the character Tâo, 'Ce mot me
semble ne pas pouvoir être bien traduit, si ce n'est par le mot
{GREEK lo'gos"> dans le triple sens de souverain Être, de raison,
et de parole.'
Rémusat's successor in the chair of Chinese, the late Stanislas
Julien, published in 1842 a translation of the whole treatise.
Having concluded from an examination of it, and the earliest Tâoist
writers, such as Kwang-dze, Ho-kwan Dze, and Ho-shang Kung, that
the Tâo was devoid of action, of thought, of judgment, and of
intelligence, he concluded that it was impossible to understand
by it 'the Primordial Reason, or the Sublime Intelligence which
created, and which governs the world,' and to
this he subjoined the following note:—'Quelque étrange que
puisse paraître cette idée de Lâo-dze, elle n'est pas sans exemple
dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Le mot nature n'a-t-il pas
été employé par certains philosophes, que la religion et la raison
condamnent, pour désigner une cause première, également dépourvue
de pensée et d'intelligence?' Julien himself did not doubt that
Lâo's idea of the character was that it primarily and properly
meant 'a way,' and hence he translated the title Tâo Teh King
by 'Le Livre de la Voie et de la Vertu,' transferring at the same
time the name Tâo to the text of his: version.
The first English writer who endeavoured to give a distinct account
of Tâoism was the late Archdeacon Hardwick, while he held the
office of Christian Advocate in the University of Cambridge. In
his 'Christ and other Masters' (vol. ii, p. 67), when treating
of the religions of China, he says,': I feel disposed to argue
that the centre of the system founded by Lâo-dze had been awarded
to some energy or power resembling the "Nature" of modern speculators.
The indefinite expression Tâo was adopted to denominate an abstract
cause, of the initial principle of life and order, to which worshippers
were able to assign the attributes of immateriality, eternity,
immensity, invisibility.'
It was, probably, Julien's reference in his note to the use of
the term nature, which suggested to Hardwick his analogy between
Lâo-dze's Tâo, and 'the Nature of modern speculation.' Canon Farrar
has said, 'We have long personified under the name of Nature the
sum total of God's laws as observed in the physical world; and
now the notion of Nature as a distinct, living, independent entity
seems to be ineradicable alike from our literature and our systems
of philosophy.' But it seems to me that this metaphorical or mythological
use of the word nature for the Cause and Ruler of it, implies
the previous notion of Him, that is, of God, in the mind. Does
not this clearly appear in the words of Seneca?—'Vis illum
(h.e. jovem Deum) naturam vocare, non
peccabis:—hic est ex quo nata sunt omnia, cujus spiritu
vivimus.'
In his translation of the Works of Kwang-dze in 1881, Mr. Balfour
adopted Nature as the ordinary rendering of the Chinese Tâo. He
says, 'When the word is translated Way, it means the Way of Nature,—her
processes, her methods, and her laws; when translated Reason,
it is the same as lî,—the power that works in all created
things, producing, preserving, and life-giving,—the intelligent
principle of the world; when translated Doctrine, it refers to
the True doctrine respecting the laws and mysteries of Nature.'
He calls attention also to the point that 'he uses NATURE in the
sense of Natura naturans, while the Chinese expression wan wû
(= all things) denotes Natura naturata.' But this really comes
to the metaphorical use of nature which has been touched upon
above. It can claim as its patrons great names like those of Aquinas,
Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza, but I have never been able to see
that its barbarous phraseology makes it more than a figure of
speech.
The term Nature, however, is so handy, and often fits so appropriately
into a version, that if Tâo had ever such a signification I should
not hesitate to employ it as freely as Mr. Balfour has done; but
as it has not that signification, to try to put a non-natural
meaning into it, only perplexes the mind, and obscures the idea
of Lâo-dze.
Mr. Balfour himself says (p. xviii), 'The primary signification
of Tâo is simply "road."' Beyond question this meaning underlies
the use of it by the great master of Tâoism and by Kwang-dze. Let the reader refer to the version of the twenty-fifth
chapter of Lâo's treatise, and to the
notes subjoined to it. There Tâo appears as the spontaneously
operating cause of all movement in the phenomena of the universe;
and the nearest the writer can come to a name for it is 'the Great
Tâo.' Having established this name, he subsequently uses it repeatedly;
see chh. xxxiv and liii. In the third paragraph of his twentieth
chapter, Kwang-dze uses a synonymous phrase instead of Lâo's 'Great
Tâo,' calling it the 'Great Thû,' about which there can be no
dispute, as meaning 'the Great Path,' 'Way,' or 'Course.' In the last paragraph of his twenty-fifth Book, Kwang-dze
again sets forth the metaphorical origin of the name Tâo. 'Tâo,'
he says, 'cannot be regarded as having a positive existence; existences
cannot be regarded as non-existent. The name Tâo is a metaphor
used for the purpose of description. To say that it exercises
some causation, or that it does nothing, is speaking of it from
the phase of a thing;—how can such language serve as a designation
of it in its greatness? If words were sufficient for the purpose,
we might in a day's time exhaust the subject of the Tâo. Words
not being sufficient, we may talk about it the whole day, and
the subject of discourse will only have been a thing. Tâo is the
extreme to which things conduct us. Neither speech nor silence
is sufficient to convey the notion of it. When we neither speak
nor refrain from speech, our speculations about it reach their
highest point.'
The Tâo therefore is a phenomenon; not a positive being, but a
mode of being. Lâo's idea of it may become plainer as we proceed
to other points of his system. In the meantime, the best way of
dealing with it in translating is to transfer it to the version,
instead of trying to introduce an English equivalent for it.
Usage of the term Thien.
2. Next in importance to Tâo is the name Thien, meaning at first
the vaulted sky or the open firmament of heaven. In the Confucian
Classics, and in the speech of the Chinese
people, this name is used metaphorically as it is by our selves
for the Supreme Being, with reference especially to His will and
rule. So it was that the idea of God arose among the Chinese fathers;
so it was that they proceeded to fashion a name for God, calling
Him Tî, and Shang Tî, 'the Ruler,' and 'the Supreme Ruler.' The
Tâoist fathers found this among their people; but in their idea
of the Tâo they had already a Supreme Concept which superseded
the necessity of any other. The name Tî for God only occurs once
in the Tâo Teh King; in the well-known passage of the fourth chapter,
where, speaking of the Tâo, Lâo-dze says, 'I do not know whose
Son it is; it might seem to be before God.'
Nor is the name Thien very common. We have the phrase, 'Heaven
and Earth,' used for the two great constituents of the kosmos,
owing their origin to the Tâo, and also for a sort of binomial
power, acting in harmony with the Tâo, covering, protecting, nurturing,
and maturing all things. Never once is Thien used in the sense
of God, the Supreme Being. In its peculiarly Tâoistic employment,
it is more an adjective than a noun. 'The Tâo of Heaven' means
the Tâo that is Heavenly, the course that is quiet and undemonstrative,
that is free from motive and effort, such as is seen in the processes
of nature, grandly proceeding and successful without any striving
or crying. The Tâo of man, not dominated by this Tâo, is contrary
to it, and shows will, purpose, and effort, till, submitting to
it, it becomes 'the Tâo or Way of the Sages,' which in all its
action has no striving.
The characteristics both of Heaven and man are dealt with more
fully by Kwang than by Lâo. In the conclusion of his eleventh
Book, for instance, he says:—'What do we mean by Tâo? There
is the Tâo (or Way) of Heaven, and there is the Tâo of man. Acting
without action, and yet attracting all honour, is the Way of Heaven.
Doing and being embarrassed thereby is the Way of man. The Way
of Heaven should play the part of lord; the Way of man, the part
of minister. The two are far apart, and should be distinguished
from each other.'
In his next Book (par. 2), Kwang-dze tells us what he intends
by 'Heaven:'—'Acting without action,—this is what
is called Heaven.' Heaven thus takes its law from the Tâo. 'The
oldest sages and sovereigns attained to do the same,'—it
was for all men to aim at the same achievement. As they were successful,
'vacancy, stillness, placidity, tastelessness, quietude, silence,
and non-action' would be found to be their characteristics, and
they would go on to the perfection of the Tâo.
The employment of Thien by the Confucianists, as of Heaven by
ourselves, must be distinguished therefore from the Tâoistic use
of the name to denote the quiet but mighty influence of the impersonal
Tâo; and to translate it by 'God' only obscures the meaning of
the Tâoist writers. This has been done by Mr. Giles in his version
of Kwang-dze, which is otherwise for the most part so good. Everywhere
on his pages there appears the great name 'God;'—a blot
on his translation more painful to my eyes and ears than the use
of' Nature' for Tâo by Mr. Balfour. I know that Mr. Giles's plan
in translating is to use strictly English equivalents for all
kinds of Chinese terms. The plan is good where there are in the two languages
such strict equivalents; but in the case before us there is no
ground for its application. The exact English equivalent for the
Chinese thien is our heaven. The Confucianists often used thien
metaphorically for the personal Being whom they denominated Tî
(God) and Shang Tî (the Supreme God), and a translator may occasionally,
in working on books of Confucian literature, employ our name God
for it. But neither Lâo nor Kwang ever attached anything like
our idea of God to it; and when one, in working on books of early
Tâoist literature, translates thien by God, such a rendering must
fail to produce in an English reader a correct apprehension of
the meaning.
Peculiar usage of Thien in Kwang-dze.
There is also in Kwang-dze a peculiar usage of the name Thien.
He applies it to the Beings whom he introduces as
Masters of the Tâo, generally with mystical appellations in order
to set forth his own views. Two instances from Book XI will suffice
in illustration of this. In par. 4, Hwang-Tî does reverence to
his instructor Kwang Khäng-dze, saying, 'In Kwang Khäng-dze we have an example of
what is called Heaven,' which Mr. Giles renders 'Kwang Khäng Dze
is surely God.' In par. 5, again, the mystical Yûn-kiang is made
to say to the equally fabulous and mystical Hung-mung, 'O Heaven,
have you forgotten me?' and, farther on, 'O Heaven, you have conferred
on me (the knowledge of) your operation, and revealed to me the
mystery of it;' in both which passages Mr. Giles renders thien
by 'your Holiness.'
Mr. Giles's own ideal of the meaning of the name 'God' as the
equivalent of Thien.
But Mr. Giles seems to agree with me that the old Tâoists had
no idea of a personal God, when they wrote of Thien or Heaven.
On his sixty- eighth page, near the beginning of Book VI, we meet
with the following sentence, having every appearance of being
translated from the Chinese text:—'God is a principle which
exists by virtue of its own intrinsicality, and operates without
self-manifestation.' By an inadvertence he has introduced his
own definition of 'God' as if it were Kwang-dze's; and though
I can find no characters in the text of which I can suppose that
he intends it to be the translation, it is valuable as helping
us to understand the meaning to be attached to the Great Name
in his volume.
The relation of the Tâo to Tî.
I have referred above (p. 16) to the only passage in Lâo's treatise,
where he uses the name Tî or God in its highest sense, saying
that 'the Tâo might seem to have been before Him.' He might well
say so, for in his first chapter be describes the Tâo, '(conceived
of as) having no name, as the Originator of heaven and
earth, and (conceived of as) having a name, as the Mother of all
things.' The reader will also find the same predicates of the
Tâo at greater length in his fifty-first chapter.
The character Tî is also of rare occurrence in Kwang-dze, excepting
as applied to the five ancient Tîs. In Bk. III, par. 4, and in
one other place, we find it indicating the Supreme Being, but
the usage is ascribed to the ancients. In Bk. XV, par, 3, in a
description of the human SPIRIT, its name is said to be 'Thung
Tî,' which Mr. Giles renders 'Of God;' Mr. Balfour, 'One with
God;' while my own version is 'The Divinity in Man.' In Bk. XII,
par. 6, we have the expression 'the place of God;' in Mr. Giles,
'the kingdom of God;' in Mr. Balfour, 'the home of God.' In this
and the former instance, the character seems to be used with the
ancient meaning which had entered into the folklore of the people.
But in Bk. VI, par. 7, there is a passage which shows clearly
the relative position of Tâo and Tî in the Tâoistic system; and
having called attention to it, I will go on to other points. Let
the reader mark well the following predicates of the Tâo:—'Before
there were heaven and earth, from of old, there It was, securely
existing. From It came the mysterious existence of spirits; from
It the mysterious existence of Tî (God). It produced heaven, It
produced earth.' This says more than the utterance of Lâo,—that
'the Tâo seemed to be before God;'—does it not say that
Tâo was before God, and that He was what He is by virtue of Its
operation?
No idea of Creation proper in Tâoism.
3. Among the various personal names given to the Tâo are those
of Zâo Hwâ, 'Maker and Transformer,' and Zâo Wû Kê, 'Maker of
things.'
Instances of both these names are found in Bk. VI, parr. 9, 10.
'Creator' and 'God' have both been employed for them; but there
is no idea of Creation in Tâoism.
Again and again Kwang-dze entertains the question of
how it was at the first beginning of things. Different views are
stated. In Bk. II, par. 4, he says:—'Among the men of old
their knowledge reached the extreme point. What was that extreme
point?
'Some held that at first there was not anything. This is the extreme
point,—the utmost limit to which nothing can be added.
'A second class held that there was something, but without any
responsive recognition of it (on the part of man).
'A third class held that there was such recognition, but there
had not begun to be any expression of different opinions about
it. It was through the definite expression of different opinions
about it that there ensued injury to the (doctrine of the)
Tâo.'
The first of these three views was that which Kwang-dze himself
preferred. The most condensed expression of it is given in Bk.
XII, par. 8:—'In the Grand Beginning of all things there
was nothing in all the vacancy of space; there was nothing that
could be named.
It was in this state that there arose the first existence; the
first existence, but still without bodily shape. From this things
could be produced, (receiving) what we call their several characters.
That which had no bodily shape was divided, and then without intermission
there was what we call the process of conferring. (The two processes)
continued to operate, and things were produced. As they were completed,
there appeared the distinguishing lines of each, which we call
the bodily shape. That shape was the body preserving in it the
spirit, and each had its peculiar manifestation which we call
its nature.'
Such was the genesis of things; the formation of heaven
and earth and all that in them is, under the guidance of the Tâo.
It was an evolution and not a creation. How the Tâo itself came,—I
do not say into existence, but into operation,—neither Lâo
nor Kwang ever thought of saying anything about. We have seen
that it is nothing material.
It acted spontaneously of itself. Its sudden appearance in the
field of non-existence, Producer, Transformer, Beautifier, surpasses
my comprehension. To Lâo it seemed to be before God. I am compelled
to accept the existence of God, as the ultimate Fact, bowing before
it with reverence, and not attempting to explain it, the one mystery,
the sole mystery of the universe.
Man is composed of body and spirit.
4. 'The bodily shape was the body preserving in it the spirit,
and each had its peculiar manifestation which we call its nature.'
So it is said in the passage quoted above from Kwang-dze's twelfth
Book, and the language shows how Tâoism, in a loose and indefinite
way, considered man to be composed of body and spirit, associated
together, yet not necessarily dependent on each other. Little
is found bearing on this tenet in the Tâo Teh King. The concluding
sentence of ch. 33, 'He who dies and yet does not perish, has
longevity,' is of doubtful acceptation. More pertinent is the
description of life as 'a coming forth,' and of death as 'an entering;'
but Kwang-dze expounds more fully, though after all unsatisfactorily,
the teaching of their system on the subject.
At the conclusion of his third Book, writing of the death of Lâo-dze,
he says, 'When the master came, it was at the proper time; when
he went away, it was the simple sequence (of his coming). Quiet
acquiescence in what happens at its proper time, and quietly submitting
(to its sequence), afford no occasion for grief or for joy. The
ancients described (death) as the loosening of the cord on which
God suspended (the life). What we can point to are the faggots
that have been consumed; but the fire is transmitted elsewhere,
and we know not that it is over and ended.'
It is, however, in connexion with the death of his own wife, as
related in the eighteenth Book, that his views most fully—I
do not say 'clearly'—appear. We are told that when that
event took place, his friend Hui-dze went to condole with him,
and found him squatted on the ground, drumming on the vessel (of
ice), and singing. His friend said to him, 'When a wife has lived
with her husband, brought up children, and then dies in her old
age, not to wail for her is enough. When you go on to drum on
the vessel and sing, is it not an excessive (and strange) demonstration?'
Kwang-dze replied, 'It is not so. When she first died, was it
possible for me to be singular, and not affected by the event?
But I reflected on the commencement of her being, when she had
not yet been born to life. Not only had she no life, but she had
no bodily form. Not only had she no bodily form, but she had no
breath. Suddenly in this chaotic condition there ensued a change,
and there was breath; another change, and there was the bodily
form; a further change, and she was born to life; a change now
again, and she is dead. The relation between those changes is
like the procession of the four seasons,—spring, autumn,
winter, and summer. There she lies with her face up, sleeping
in the Great Chamber;
and if I were to fall sobbing and going on to wail for her,
I should think I did not understand what was appointed for all.
I therefore restrained myself.'
The next paragraph of the same Book contains another story about
two ancient men, both deformed, who, when looking at the graves
on Kwän-lun, begin to feel in their own frames the symptoms of
approaching dissolution. One says to the other, 'Do you dread
it?' and gets the reply, 'No. Why should I dread it? Life is a
borrowed thing. The living frame thus borrowed is but so much
dust. Life and death are like day and night.'
In every birth, it would thus appear, there is, somehow, a repetition
of what it is said, as we have seen, took place at 'the Grand
Beginning of all things,' when out of the
primal nothingness, the Tâo somehow appeared, and there was developed
through its operation the world of things,—material things
and the material body of man, which enshrines or enshrouds an
immaterial spirit. This returns to the Tâo that gave it, and may
be regarded indeed as that Tâo operating in the body during the
time of life, and in due time receives a new embodiment.
In these notions of Tâoism there was a preparation for the appreciation
by its followers of the Buddhistic system when it came to be introduced
into the country, and which forms a close connexion between the
two at the present day, Tâoism itself constantly becoming less
definite and influential on the minds of the Chinese people. The
Book which tells us of the death of Kwang-dze's wife concludes
with a narrative about Lieh-dze and an old bleached skull, and to this is appended a passage
about the metamorphoses of things, ending with the statement that
'the panther produces the
horse, and the horse the man, who then again enters into the great
machinery (of evolution), from which all things come forth (at
birth) and into which they re-enter (at death).' Such representations
need not be characterised.
The Tâo as promotive of longevity.
5. Kû Hsî, 'the prince of Literature,' described the main object
of Tâoism to be 'the preservation of the breath of life;' and
Liû Mî, probably of our thirteenth century,
in his 'Dispassionate Comparison of the Three Religions,' declares
that 'its chief achievement is the prolongation of longevity.'
Such is the account of Tâoism ordinarily given by Confucian and
Buddhist writers, but our authorities, Lâo and Kwang, hardly bear
out this representation of it as true of their time. There are
chapters of the Tâo Teh King which presuppose
a peculiar management of the breath, but the treatise is singularly
free from anything to justify what Mr. Balfour well calls 'the
antics of the Kung-fû, or system of mystic and recondite calisthenics.'
Lâo insists, however, on the Tâo as conducive to long life,
and in Kwang-dze we have references to it as a discipline of longevity,
though even he mentions rather with disapproval 'those who kept
blowing and breathing with open mouth, inhaling and exhaling the
breath, expelling the old and taking in new; passing their time
like the (dormant) bear, and stretching and twisting (their necks)
like birds.' He says that 'all this simply shows their desire
for longevity, and is what the scholars who manage the breath,
and men who nourish the body and wish to live as long as Phäng-zû,
are fond of doing.' My own opinion is that the methods
of the Tâo were first cultivated
for the sake of the longevity which they were thought to promote,
and that Lâo, discountenancing such a use of them, endeavoured
to give the doctrine a higher character; and this view is favoured
by passages in Kwang-dze. In the seventh paragraph, for instance,
of his Book VI, speaking of parties who had obtained the Tâo,
he begins with a prehistoric sovereign, who 'got it and by it
adjusted heaven and earth.' Among his other instances is Phäng-zû,
who got it in the time of Shun, and lived on to the time of the
five leading princes of Kâu,—a longevity of more than 1800
years, greater than that ascribed to Methuselah! In the paragraph
that follows there appears a Nü Yü, who is addressed by another
famous Tâoist in the words, 'You are old, Sir, while your complexion
is like that of a child;—how is it so?' and the reply is,
'I became acquainted with the Tâo.'
I will adduce only one more passage of Kwang. In his eleventh
Book, and the fourth paragraph, he tells us of interviews between
Hwang-Tî, in the nineteenth year of his reign, which would be
13. C. 2679, and his instructor Kwang Khäng-dze. The Tâoist sage
is not readily prevailed on to unfold
the treasures of his knowledge to the sovereign, but at last his
reluctance is overcome, and he says to him, 'Come, and I will
tell you about the Perfect Tâo. Its essence is surrounded with
the deepest obscurity; its highest reach is in darkness and silence.
There is nothing to be seen, nothing to be heard. When it holds
the spirit in its arms in stillness, then the bodily form will
of itself become correct. You must be still, you must be pure;
not subjecting your body to toil, not agitating your vital force:—then
you may live for long. When your eyes see nothing, your ears hear
nothing, and your mind knows nothing, your spirit will keep your
body, and the body will live long. Watch over what is within you;
shut up the avenues that connect you with what is external;—much
knowledge is pernicious. I will proceed with you to the summit
of the Grand Brilliance, where we come to the bright and expanding
(element); I will enter with you the gate of the dark and depressing
element. There heaven and earth have their Controllers; there
the Yin and Yang have their Repositories. Watch over and keep
your body, and all things will of themselves give it vigour. I
maintain the (original) unity (of these elements). In this way
I have cultivated myself for 1200 years, and my bodily form knows
no decay.' Add 1200 to 2679, and we obtain 3879 as the year B.C.
of Kwang Khäng-dze's birth!
Startling results of the Tâo.
6. Lâo-dze describes some other and kindred results of cultivating
the Tâo in terms which are sufficiently startling, and which it
is difficult to accept. In his fiftieth chapter he says, 'He who
is skilful in managing his life travels on land without having
to shun rhinoceros or tiger, and enters a host without having
to avoid buff coat or sharp weapon. The rhinoceros finds no place
in him into which to thrust its horn, nor the tiger a place in
which to fix its claws, nor the weapon a place to admit its point.
And for what reason? Because there is in him no place of death.'
To the same effect he says in his fifty-fifth chapter, 'He who
has in himself abundantly the attributes (of the Tâo) is like
an infant. Poisonous insects will not
sting him; fierce beasts will not seize him; birds of prey will
not strike him.'
Such assertions startle us by their contrariety to our observation
and experience, but so does most of the teaching of Tâoism. What
can seem more absurd than the declaration that 'the Tâo does nothing,
and so there is nothing that it does not do?' And yet this is
one of the fundamental axioms of the system. The thirty-seventh
chapter, which enunciates it, goes on to say, 'If princes and
kings were able to maintain (the Tâo), all things would of themselves
be transformed by them.' This principle, if we can call it so,
is generalised in the fortieth, one of the shortest chapters,
and partly in rhyme:—
The movement of the Tâo
By contraries proceeds;
And weakness marks the course
Of Tâo's mighty deeds.
All things under heaven sprang from it as existing (and named);
that existence sprang from it as non-existent (and not named).'
Ho-shang Kung, or whoever gave their names to the chapters of
the Tâo Teh King, styles this fortieth chapter 'Dispensing with
the use (of means).' If the wish to use means arise in the mind,
the nature of the Tâo as 'the Nameless Simplicity' has been vitiated;
and this nature is celebrated in lines like those just quoted
'Simplicity without a name
Is free from all external aim.
With no desire, at rest and still,
All things go right, as of their will.'
I do not cull any passages from Kwang-dze to illustrate these
points. In his eleventh Book his subject is Government by 'Let-a-be
and the exercise of Forbearance.'
The paradisiacal state.
7. This Tâo ruled men at first, and then the world was in a paradisiacal
state. Neither of our authorities tells us how long this condition
lasted, but as Lâo observes in his eighteenth chapter, 'the Tâo
ceased to be observed.' Kwang-dze, however, gives us
more than one description of what he considered the paradisiacal
state was. He calls it 'the age of Perfect Virtue.' In the thirteenth
paragraph of his twelfth Book he says, 'In this age, they attached
no value to wisdom, nor employed men of ability. Superiors were
(but) as the higher branches of a tree; and the people were like
the deer of the wild. They were upright and correct, without knowing
that to be so was Righteousness; they loved one another, without
knowing that to do so was Benevolence; they were honest and leal-hearted,
without knowing that it was Loyalty; they fulfilled their engagements,
without knowing that to do so was Good Faith; in their movements
they employed the services of one another, without thinking that
they were conferring or receiving any gift. Therefore their actions
left no trace, and there was no record of their affairs.'
Again, in the fourth paragraph of his tenth Book, addressing an
imaginary interlocutor, he says, 'Are you, Sir, unacquainted with
the age of Perfect Virtue?' He then gives the names of twelve
sovereigns who ruled in it, of the greater number of whom we have
no other means of knowing anything, and goes on:—'In their
times the people used knotted cords in carrying on their business.
They thought their (simple) food pleasant, and their (plain) clothing
beautiful. They were happy in their (simple) manners, and felt
at rest in their (poor) dwellings. (The people of) neighbouring
states might be able to descry one another; the voices of their
cocks and dogs might be heard from one to the other; they might
not die till they were old; and yet all their life they would
have no communication together. In those times perfect good order
prevailed.'
One other description of the primeval state is still more interesting.
It is in the second paragraph of Bk. IX: 'The people had their
regular and constant nature:—they wove and made themselves
clothes; they tilled the ground and got food. This was their common
faculty. They were all one in this, and did not form themselves
into separate classes; so were they constituted and left to their
natural tendencies. Therefore in the age of Perfect Virtue men
walked along with slow and grave step, and with their
looks steadily directed forwards. On the hills there were no footpaths
nor excavated passages; on the lakes there were no boats nor dams.
All creatures lived in companies, and their places of settlement
were made near to one another. Birds and beasts multiplied to
flocks and herds; the grass and trees grew luxuriant and long.
The birds and beasts might be led about without feeling the constraint;
the nest of the magpie might be climbed to, and peeped into. Yes,
in the age of Perfect Virtue, men lived in common with birds and
beasts, and were on terms of equality with all creatures, as forming
one family;—how could they know among themselves the distinctions
of superior men and small men? Equally without knowledge, they
did not leave the path of their natural virtue; equally free from
desires, they were in the state of pure simplicity. In that pure
simplicity, their nature was what it ought to be.'
Such were the earliest Chinese of whom Kwang-dze could venture
to give any account. If ever their ancestors had been in a ruder
or savage condition, it must have been at a much antecedent time.
These had long passed out of such a state; they were tillers of
the ground, and acquainted with the use of the loom. They lived
in happy relations with one another, and in kindly harmony with
the tribes of inferior creatures. But there is not the slightest
allusion to any sentiment of piety as animating them individually,
or to any ceremony of religion as observed by them in common.
This surely is a remarkable feature in their condition. I call
attention to it, but I do not dwell upon it.
The decay of the Tâo before the growth of knowledge.
8. But by the time of Lâo and Kwang the cultivation of the Tâo
had fallen into disuse. The simplicity of life which it demanded,
with its freedom from all disturbing speculation and action, was
no longer to be found in individuals or in government. It was
the general decay of manners and of social order which unsettled
the mind of Lâo, made him resign his position as a curator of
the Royal Library, and determine to withdraw from China and hide
himself among the rude peoples beyond
it. The cause of the deterioration of the Tâo and of all the evils
of the nation was attributed to the ever-growing pursuit of knowledge,
and of what we call the arts of culture. It had commenced very
long before;—in the time of Hwang-Tî, Kwang says in one
place;
and in another he carries it still higher to Sui-zän and Fu-hsî.
There had been indeed, all along the line of history, a groping
for the rules of life, as indicated by the constitution of man's
nature. The results were embodied in the ancient literature which
was the lifelong study of Confucius. He had gathered up that literature;
he recognised the nature of man as the gift of Heaven or God.
The monitions of God as given in the convictions of man's mind
supplied him with a Tâo or Path of duty very different from the
Tâo or Mysterious Way of Lâo. All this was gall and wormwood to
the dreaming librarian or brooding recluse, and made him say,
'If we could renounce our sageness and discard our wisdom, it
would be better for the people a hundredfold. If we could renounce
our benevolence and discard our righteousness, the people would
again become filial and kindly. If we could renounce our artful
contrivances and discard our (scheming for) gain, there would
be no thieves nor robbers.'
We can laugh at this. Tâoism was wrong in its opposition to the
increase of knowledge. Man exists under a law of progress. In
pursuing it there are demanded discretion and justice. Moral ends
must rule over material ends, and advance in virtue be ranked
higher than advance in science. So have good and evil, truth and
error, to fight out the battle on the field of the world, and
in all the range of time; but there is no standing still for the
individual or for society. Even Confucius taught his countrymen
to set too high a value on the examples of antiquity. The school
of Lâo-dze fixing themselves in an unknown region beyond antiquity,—a
prehistoric time between 'the Grand Beginning of all things' out
of nothing, and the unknown commencement of societies of men,—has
made no advance but rather retrograded,
and is represented by the still more degenerate Tâoism of the
present day.
There is a short parabolic story of Kwang-dze, intended to represent
the antagonism between Tâoism and knowledge, which has always
struck me as curious. The last paragraph of his seventh Book is
this:—'The Ruler (or god Tî) of the Southern Ocean was Shû
(that is, Heedless); the Ruler of the Northern Ocean was Hû (that
is, Hasty); and the Ruler of the Centre was Hwun-tun (that is,
Chaos). Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of Hwun-tun,
who treated them very well. They consulted together how they might
repay his kindness, and said, "Men have all seven orifices for
the purposes of seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing, while
this (poor) Ruler alone has not one. Let us try and make them
for him." Accordingly they dug one orifice in him every day; and
at the end of seven days Chaos died.'
So it was that Chaos passed away before Light. So did the nameless
Simplicity of the Tâo disappear before Knowledge. But it was better
that the Chaos should give place to the Kosmos. 'Heedless' and
'Hasty' did a good deed.
The practical lessons of Lâo-dze.
9. I have thus set forth eight characteristics of the Tâoistic
system, having respect mostly to what is peculiar and mystical
in it. I will now conclude my exhibition of it by bringing together
under one head the practical lessons of its author for men individually,
and for the administration of government. The praise of whatever
excellence these possess belongs to Lâo himself: Kwang-dze devotes
himself mainly to the illustration of the abstruse and difficult
points.
Humility.
First, it does not surprise us that in his rules for individual
man, Lâo should place Humility in the foremost place. A favourite
illustration with him of the Tâo is water. In his eighth chapter
he says:—'The highest excellence is like that of water.
The excellence of water appears in its benefiting all things,
and in its occupying, without striving to the contrary, the low
ground which all men dislike. Hence (its way) is near to that
of the Tâo.' To the same effect in the seventy-eighth
chapter:—'There is nothing in the world more soft and weak
than water, and yet for attacking things that are firm and strong
there is nothing that can take precedence of it. Every one in
the world knows that the soft overcomes the hard, and the weak
the strong; but no one is able to carry it out in practice.'
Lao's three Jewels.
In his sixty-seventh chapter Lâo associates with Humility two
other virtues, and calls them his three Precious Things or Jewels.
They are Gentleness, Economy, and Shrinking from taking precedence
of others. 'With that Gentleness,' he says, 'I can be bold; with
that Economy I can be liberal; Shrinking from taking precedence
of others, I can become a vessel of the highest honour.'
Rendering good for evil.
And in his sixty-third chapter, he rises to a still loftier height
of morality. He says, '(It is the way of the Tâo) to act without
(thinking of) acting, to conduct affairs without (feeling) the
trouble of them; to taste without discerning any flavour, to consider
the small as great, and the few as many, and to recompense injury
with kindness.'
Here is the grand Christian precept, 'Render to no man evil for
evil. If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him
drink. Be not overcome with evil, but overcome evil with good.'
We know that the maxim made some noise in its author's lifetime;
that the disciples of Confucius consulted him about it, and that
he was unable to receive it. It comes in with less important
matters by virtue of the Tâoistic
'rule of contraries.' I have been surprised to find what little
reference to it I have met with in the course of my Chinese reading.
I do not think that Kwang-dze takes notice of it to illustrate
it after his fashion. There, however, it is in the Tâo Teh King.
The fruit of it has yet to be developed.
Second, Lâo laid down the same rule for the policy of the state
as for the life of the individual. He says in his sixty-first
chapter, 'What makes a state great is its being like a low-lying,
down-flowing stream;—it becomes the
centre to which tend all (the small states) under heaven.' He
then uses an illustration which will produce a smile:—'Take
the case of all females. The female always overcomes the male
by her stillness. Stillness may be considered (a sort of) abasement.'
Resuming his subject, he adds, 'Thus it is that a great state,
by condescending to small states, gains them for itself; and that
small states, by abasing themselves to a great state, win it over
to them. In the one case the abasement tends to gaining adherents;
in the other case, to procuring favour. The great state only wishes
to unite men together and nourish them; a small state only wishes
to be received by, and to serve, the other. Each gets what it
desires, but the great state must learn to abase itself.'
'All very well in theory,' some one will exclaim, 'but, the world
has not seen it yet reduced to practice.' So it is. The fact is
deplorable. No one saw the misery arising from it, and exposed
its unreasonableness more unsparingly, than Kwang-dze. But it
was all in vain in his time, as it has been in all the centuries
that have since rolled their course. Philosophy, philanthropy,
and religion have still to toil on, 'faint, yet pursuing,' believing
that the time will yet come when humility and love shall secure
the reign of peace and good will among the nations of men.
While enjoining humility, Lâo protested against war. In his thirty-first
chapter he says, 'Arms, however beautiful, are instruments of
evil omen; hateful, it may be said, to all creatures. They who
have the Tâo do not like to employ them.' Perhaps in his sixty-ninth
chapter he allows defensive war, but he adds, 'There is no calamity
greater than that of lightly engaging in war. To do that is near
losing the gentleness which is so precious. Thus it is that when
weapons are (actually) crossed, he who deplores the (situation)
conquers.'
There are some other points in the practical lessons of Tâoism
to which I should like to call the attention of the reader, but
I must refer him for them to the chapters of the Tâo Teh King,
and the Books of Kwang-dze. Its salient features have been set
forth somewhat fully. Notwithstanding
the scorn poured so freely on Confucius by Kwang-dze and other
Tâoist writers, he proved in the course of time too strong for
Lâo as the teacher of their people. The entrance of Buddhism,
moreover, into the country in our first century, was very injurious
to Tâoism, which still exists, but is only the shadow of its former
self. It is tolerated by the government, but not patronised as
it was when emperors and empresses seemed to think more of it
than of Confucianism. It is by the spread of knowledge, which
it has always opposed, that its overthrow and disappearance will
be brought about ere long.
1
Language and Languages, pp. 184, 185.
2
Natur. Quaest. lib. II, cap. xlv.
3
Martineau's 'Types of Ethical Theory,' I, p. 286, and his whole
'Conjectural History of Spinoza's Thought.'
4
### is equivalent to the Greek h` o`do's, the way. Where
this name for the Christian system occurs in our Revised Version
of the New Testament in the Acts of the Apostles, the literal
rendering is adhered to, Way being printed with a capital W. See
Acts ix. 2; xix. 9, 23; xxii. 4; xxiv. 14, 22.
5
###. The Khang-hsî dictionary defines thû by lû, road or way.
Medhurst gives 'road.' Unfortunately, both Morrison and Williams
overlooked this definition of the character. Giles has also a
note in loc., showing how this synonym settles the original meaning
of Tâo in the sense of 'road.'
6
The Tâo Teh King, Ch. 25, and Kwang-dze, XIII, par. 1.
7
See 'Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio,' vol. i, p. i, note
2.
8
Kwang Khäng-dze heads the list of characters in Ko Hung's 'History
of Spirit-like Immortals (###),' written in our fourth century.
'He was,' it is said, 'an Immortal of old, who lives on the hill
of M'ung-thung in a grotto of rocks.'
9
For this sentence we find in Mr. Balfour:—'Spirits of the
dead, receiving It, become divine; the very gods themselves owe
their divinity to its influence; and by it both Heaven and Earth
were produced.' The version of it by Mr. Giles is too condensed:—'Spiritual
beings drew their spirituality therefrom, while the universe became
what we see it now.'
10
Compare also Bk. XXII, parr. 7, 8, and XXIII, par. 10.
11
Mr. Balfour had given for this sentence:—'In the beginning
of all things there was not even nothing. There were no names;
these arose afterwards.' In his critique on Mr. Balfour's version
in 1882, Mr. Giles proposed:—'At the beginning of all things
there was nothing; but this nothing had no name.' He now in his
own version gives for it, 'At the beginning of the beginning,
even nothing did not exist. Then came the period of the nameless;'—an
improvement, certainly, on the other; but which can hardly be
accepted as the correct version of the text.
12
The Tâo Teh King, ch. 14; et al.
13
Ch. 60.
14
That is, between heaven and earth.
15
Quoted in the Amplification of the Sixteen Precepts or Maxims
of the second emperor of the present dynasty by his son. The words
are from Dr. Milne's version of 'the Sacred Edict,' p. 137.
16
In his Index to the Tripitaka, Mr. Bunyio Nanjio (P. 359) assigns
Liû Mî and his work to the Yüan dynasty. In a copy of the work
in my possession they are assigned to that of Sung. The author,
no doubt, lived under both dynasties,—from the Sung into
the Yüan.
17
See note on p, 187 of his Kwang-dze.
18
See Bk. XV, par. 1.
19
Bk. XI, par. 5.
20
Bk. XVI, par. 2.
21
Tâo Teh King, ch. 19.
22
Confucian Analects, XIV, 36.
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